We study the properties of a GEI model with nominal assets, outside money (injected into the economy as in Magill and Quinzii [17]), and multiple currencies. We analyze the existence of monetary equilibria and the structure of the equilibrium set under two di¤erent assumptions on the determination of the exchange rates. If currencies are perfect substitutes, equilibrium allocations are indeterminate and, generically, sunspot equilibria exist. Generically, given a nonsunspot equilibrium, there are Pareto improving (and Pareto worsening) sunspot equilibria associated with an increase in the volatility of the future exchange rates. We interpret this property as showing that, in general, there is no clearcut e¤ect on welfare of the excess volatility of exchange rates, even when due to purely extrinsic phenomena.
INTRODUCTION
The analysis of the determinants of exchange rates is still largely an open issue. Since Meese and Rogo¤ [21] , it is well known that standard theoretical models perform very poorly in predicting the short-run behavior of exchange rates (see also Cheung, Chinn and Pascual [7] ). Moreover, it is often claimed that exchange rates exhibit excess volatility, and that this may entail a welfare cost. Starting with Kareken and Wallace [15] , several theoretical contributions have studied economies where exchange rates may be indeterminate and may be a¤ected by extrinsic uncertainty. Their seminal paper considers a two-country overlapping generation environment with no uncertainty and where the two currencies are perfect substitutes. They show that equilibrium exchange rates are indeterminate. Their key result survives in cash-in-advance environments with in…nitely living agents and where currencies play a pure transactional role, see King, Wallace and Weber [16] . Manuelli and Peck [18] consider a stochastic OLG model, and do not restrict the analysis to stationary equilibria. They show that stationary allocations can be associated to nonconstant exchange rate processes, so that it is impossible to derive general conclusions on the e¢ ciency of equilibria looking at the volatility of exchange rates. Bear in mind that excess volatility is essentially innocuous in terms of welfare, in the two classes of economies just mentioned. An additional contribution along these lines is Russel [28] . He extends the analysis allowing for the existence of two real assets in an economy where price levels are inversely correlated (hence, returns on money holdings positively correlated) with the returns from the real assets of the same country. In this context, the author shows existence and Pareto-inferiority of quasi-sunspot equilibria. Finally, Alonso [1] considers a Shubik trading-posts model with uncertainty, and shows that equilibrium exchange rates are indeterminate and a¤ect welfare when currencies are perfect substitutes. The relevance of perfect substitutability is con…rmed by the literature on search models of money, which analyzes the conditions for the coexistence of several currencies and the endogenous choice of currencies in a multi-country environment. In particular, Martin [19] shows that, in a two-country, cash-in-advance model with …xed costs for the use of foreign currencies, the exchange rate is determinate if there are enough frictions to endogenously prevent all the agents from trading in more than one currencyi.e. if …xed costs are high enough.
Our starting point is a version of Magill and Quinzii [17] , simpli…ed by assuming that outside money has a pure transactional role. 2 A previous application of their approach to study open economies is in Neumeyer [22] . He considers a two-period, two-country economy where each country currency is injected by forcing each agent to sell her endowment of commodities to the central exchange of her home country. Agents can then use the currency to buy from the central exchange of each country.
We basically consider the same class of economies, extending the analysis to an arbitrary number of commodities (in Neumeyer [22] there is just one good in each country). We mainly study the opposite polar case, where each agent can choose the central exchange where to sell her endowment. This corresponds to the frictionless case of the literature. If, at least some, agents can choose the exchange they sell their endowment to, the price levels in the two countries are not determined anymore by their country-speci…c quantity of money equation, because the two equations collapse into just one set of restrictions. This reopens the door to the possibility of obtaining real indeterminacy of the equilibrium set. More precisely, under this formulation of the model, monetary equilibria exhibit as many degrees of real indeterminacy as the number of tomorrow states of nature. 3 We restrict the analysis to two-period, two-country economies. Obviously, this has no bearing on our results. They hold as long as the number of states of nature is …nite and asset markets are incomplete.
The logic behind the di¤erent properties of the equilibria associated with the two speci…cations of the monetary equations is transparent. Assuming perfectly free trade, absence of arbitrage opportunities in commodity trading imposes that the law of one price holds, so that commodity prices must be identical, once measured in the same currency. When, as in Neumeyer [22] , there are two distinct monetary equations for each state of nature, the money supply in each country determines the (domestic) absolute price level. Then, the PPP condition …xes the exchange rates. This leaves no "free" endogenous parameters and, generically, leads to local uniqueness of equilibria. To the contrary, if the total money supply (converted into a common currency) determines just the world price level (in the same currency), the monetary conditions are satis…ed by di¤erent combinations of price levels and exchange rates. Once we …x the period 0 numeraire and exchange rate, the remaining degrees of nominal indeterminacy generically translate into the same number of degrees of real indeterminacy. As usual in this class of economies, the two models have, in a precise sense, the same set of equilibrium allocations. With indeterminacy they are parameterized by exchange rates, which can be arbitrarily …xed. In the determined case, by the vectors of money supply. Therefore, apart from the interest of the indeterminate case per se, it is also convenient to study it because the results have a natural re-interpretation in terms of the determinate case, which is more tricky due to purely technical problems, since the rank of the matrix describing assets'payo¤s is not invariant over the set of possible exchange rate vectors.
An additional motivation for the interest in the indeterminate case is that, as common in the GEI literature, real indeterminacy of equilibria allows for the generic existence of sunspot equilibria. The possible relevance of extrinsic variables in the determination of exchange rates has been previously discussed in the literature; among others, in some of the papers mentioned above. The persistence of excess volatility in exchange rates is well-established in the empirical literature. The prevailing view is that it is unambiguously bad, welfare-wise. 4 When equilibria are indeterminate and sunspot equilibria exist, the appropriate notion of excess volatility is not completely obvious. 5 Here, we simply mean any (mean-preserving) increase in the variance of the exchange rates across equilibria. Technically, we compare a generic nonsunspot equilibrium with sunspot equilibria characterized by a (mean-preserving) increase in the variance of the exchange rates. Section 4 shows that, given an equilibrium where sunspots do not matter, generically there are Pareto improving sunspot equilibria characterized by excess volatility of the exchange rates. Not surprisingly, there are also Pareto worsening sunspot equilibria with the same characteristics in terms of volatility. Hence, in general, it is impossible to provide any theoretically sound statement on the welfare impact of excess volatility. The same basic argument also applies, modulo some technicalities, to mean-preserving spreads of the exchange rates across pure extrinsic events.
The paper is structured as follows: we present the model in Section 2. Section 3 analyzes existence and real indeterminacy of monetary equilibria in the economy with and without extrinsic uncertainty. In particular, we establish that equilibria typically exhibit as many degrees of real indeterminacy as states of nature in the second period, independently of their nature. Section 4 is devoted to the analysis of the welfare e¤ects of mean-preserving increases in the variance of exchange rates. We focus the analysis on sunspot equilibria, because, technically, this is the most demanding case and because sunspot volatility is a particularly strong de…nition of excess volatility. The same results hold in the economy without sunspots, where we can exploit full rank perturbations of the parameters of the economy. The main di¤erence concerns the restriction on the maximum number of agents for which the results hold. The …nal section brie ‡y considers the case of economies with two distinct monetary equations, i.e., the direct generalization of Neumeyer [22] .
Several de…nitions and statements are formulated with direct reference to the sunspot economy. Their counterparts for the economy with no extrinsic uncertainty are always obvious.
THE ECONOMY
The basic structure is standard. There are two time periods with S intrinsic states of nature tomorrow, indexed by s = 1; :::S; s = 0 denotes the …rst period. At each s, there are L identical physical commodities, indexed by`= 1; :::; L: There are H agents, partitioned into two sets H c ; #H c 1; where c 2 fA; Bg denotes one of the two countries.
With each intrinsic state s; we associate K extrinsic events, indexed by k = 1; :::; K: Thus, a state of nature is ks ; ks = 11;..., KS ; and L = ( + 1) L is the total number of commodities. For notational convenience, and without any loss of generality, the extrinsic variables realize before the intrinsic one and are equiprobable.
With respect to consumers, we assume:
h ; for each s and each pair k; k 0 :
The vector e e 0 ; :::; e 2 R
+1
++ describes the exchange rates, i.e., the numbers of units of the currency of country B required to buy one unit of currency A at the di¤erent spots.
The sunspot-invariant vector of asset i 0 s payo¤s in terms of home currency is r i = r i1 ; :::; r iS . Given e; the matrix of asset payo¤s in terms of currency B is R (e) = ] is the vector of asset payo¤s in spot = ks: The matrices R A (e) and R B denote the payo¤s (in terms of currency B) of the two subsets of assets. In the sequel, with some abuse of notation, we will occasionally use R (e) to refer to the payo¤ matrix in the economy without sunspots. No confusion should arise. We will always maintain:
A2:
i: I < S; ii: rank R A (1) = I A and rank R B = I B ; with I I A + I B ; and the two submatrices of R A (1) and R B associated with event k = 1 are in general position.
The general position assumption guarantees that, generically in e; R(e) has full rank I (see Lemma 1 below). For each asset i; the price (in national currency) is 
is the pair of (exogenous) vectors of money supply in the two countries: They are sunspot-invariant.
In the sequel, we will often treat asymmetrically some variables: We will use the superscript "n0" to indicate that we are ignoring the spot 0 variables. Thus, for instance, n0 (p; e) is given by the last rows of (p; e): Similarly, p nL denotes the price system, once we eliminate p L ; for each :
Exchange rate regimes
The monetary equations implicitly de…ning the exchange rate regime are obtained by an extension to a two-country model of the set-up proposed by Magill and Quinzii [17] . In a one-country economy, agents sell their initial endowments to a central exchange to acquire outside money issued by the exchange itself. In turn, they use the money so obtained to buy commodities. Moving to a two-country set-up, we have two polar cases.
In the …rst (the one considered in Neumeyer [22] ), agents must sell their initial endowment to their home country central exchange and can buy from either one of them. This implies
; for each c. Absence of commodity arbitrage imposes the additional restriction e p A = p B : While there are some technical problems for the proof of the existence of monetary equilibria, it is fairly intuitive that equilibria, and, hence, exchange rates, are determinate. There are several alternative precise speci…cations of the mechanism of trading with the two central exchanges leading to the same main result: as long as there are two separate monetary eqs., equilibria are determinate.
We describe this class of economies with the monetary equations for some arbitrary, exogenously given E 2 R +1 ++ :
It is worthwhile to stress that, generically, real indeterminacy requires perfect substitutability among currencies. For instance, equilibria of economies with di¤er-ent transaction costs for resident and non-resident trading with a central exchange are typically determined (see also, in a di¤erent set-up, Martin [19] ). Still, the case of perfect substitutability is interesting for the reasons discussed in the introduction:
Consumer' s behavior
Given (p; q; e), each agent chooses her optimal consumption bundle and portfolio (x h ; y h ) solving optimization problem
where z h (x h ! h ) ; i.e., under A1 (and omitting the irrelevant term
where h 2 R +1 ++ is the vector of Lagrange multipliers.
Equilibrium
An equilibrium is de…ned by the usual conditions, market clearing and individual optimization, and by one of the two sets of monetary equations. Definition 1. Given (M A ; M B ); a monetary equilibrium (ME) is a vector (p; q; e) with associated (x; y) such that a:
for each h, (x h ; y h ) is an optimal solution to (1), given , b:
Given a ME allocation x, sunspots do not matter if and only if, for each h and s; x ks h = x k 0 s h ; for each k and k'. In the sequel, we will always clarify the equilibrium we are considering by making reference to the relevant set of monetary equations. 
Hence, at least one degree of indeterminacy is purely nominal. In the sequel, we will mostly set e 0 = p 0L = 1, identify e with e 11 ; :::; e ; p with p 0nL ; :::; p , and drop the spot 0 monetary eqs., because they are always satis…ed, modulo a renormalization.
The space of the economies
Most of our results hold for a generic subset of economies and, at the di¤erent stages of the analysis, we will make reference just to the set of parameters that we will need to perturb. We start de…ning the space of the economies in its most general form as 
where U is the space of functions satisfying A1 above, < is the set of (sunspotinvariant) asset payo¤s such that A2 holds. Given that we are ignoring the period 0 monetary equations, (M To parameterize utility functions, we adopt a locally quadratic perturbation of u h : Consider any sunspot-invariant vector and let h be the (sunspot-invariant) agent h 0 s optimal choice. Pick any open ball
; and any smooth bump function (x h ) ; such that (
where a 2 R L(S+1) ; while D is a (L(S + 1) L(S + 1)) symmetric matrix. Evidently, given (x h ) ; for jjajj and jjDjj small enough, e u h (x h ) satis…es A1. In the sequel, a subset of is generic if it is open and dense. When utility functions are …xed, we strengthen the notion, requiring that the subset has full Lebesgue measure, too.
We consider both the economy without sunspots and the one with sunspots. In the analysis, all the fundamental parameters are obviously sunspot-invariant.
ECONOMIES WITH
G N D (:) = 0
Equilibria in the economy without extrinsic uncertainty
If we impose G nd (:) = 0, a ME always exists. It su¢ ces to …x e = E 2 R [31] , for instance. Modulo a renormalization of p 0 ; q (so that the monetary equations hold at s = 0; too); this allows us to show the existence of a ME (see Thm. 1). Moreover, under A2, and for a generic (see Lemma 1 below) choice of the vector E; rank R(E) = I: For economies in this set, generic regularity of equilibria follows by a standard argument. Hence, we simply summarize these properties.
First, it is fairly intuitive that, under A2, generically rankR(E) = I: For completeness, we formally establish this property in the next Lemma. The proof is in Appendix.
there is an open, dense subset of R S ++ ; of full Lebesgue measure, E; such that, for each E 2 E; rankR(E) = I; in the economy without sunspots:
Using Lemma 1, the next Thm. summarizes existence and regularity properties of ME. Its proof follows by a standard argument, that we omit.
Theorem 1.
Under the maintained assumptions, in the economy associated with G nd (:) = 0, there is a ME. At each E 2 E; and for each 2 0 E ; an open, dense subset of ; ME are locally described by a …nite collection of smooth functions n ( j ( ; E) ; e) typically induce di¤erent spans of the payo¤ matrix in terms of real purchasing power. Generically, this translates into indeterminacy of the equilibrium allocation. Here, changes of the vector e act on the span of the matrix R(e) through two channels: their direct e¤ect on < R(e) > 6 and their e¤ect on commodity prices, due to the monetary eqs. Hence, their proof needs to be adjusted to keep into account this last feature of our model. The details are in Appendix.
Theorem 2. Under the assumptions of Thm. 1, in the economy associated with G nd (:) = 0, if H > I and S > 2I; there is an open, dense set of economies E 0 E such that the set of equilibrium allocations has S degrees of real indeterminacy.
Remark 3. Most of the results on GEI with variable asset prices show that there are (S 1) degrees of real indeterminacy. Here, the "free" parameter E a¤ects the span of the return matrix acting di¤erently on the payo¤s of the assets of the two countries. This explains why we have one more degree of real indeterminacy than usual. A similar result holds for economies with mixed (partly real, partly nominal) payo¤s (see Geanakoplos and Mas-Colell [14, Thm. 2] and Pietra [23] ). Also, we require that the number of degrees of incompleteness is su¢ ciently large (S > 2I): This is a standard assumption for economies with both real and nominal assets (see, again, Thm. 2 in [14] and [23] ). It is quite likely that this last restriction could be relaxed at some cost in terms of technicalities.
Remark 4. Regularity of ME only requires endowment perturbations, so that it holds for a generic subset of endowments of full Lebesgue measure. To the contrary, our proof of real indeterminacy also exploits utility perturbations, so that the generic set
E is an open and dense subset of : Remark 5. The vector E plays a double role. In Thm. 1, we …x it and determine the set of regular economies 0 E ; which depends upon E: In Thm. 2, given 2 E ; we consider the set of equilibria (locally) associated with the economies described (among the other parameters) by E itself.
Remark 6. Dealing with a two-country economy, it is common to assume that there is a risk-free (in terms of home currency) asset in each country. This is a typical assumption made in most open macroeconomic models. With the monetary equations G nd (:) = 0; M E exist for each asset structure such that A2 holds. In Lemma 1, we just require that R A (1) and R B are in general position (not that [R A (1) R B ] is). Hence, the result holds if we require the existence of a risk-free asset in each country. The proofs of Thm. 1 and 2 do not require perturbations of the payo¤s of assets 1 and I A + 1 either, so that they hold if we impose this additional restriction. This also implies that there is no loss of generality in our ignoring the role of outside money as a store of value.
Sunspot equilibria
Here, we consider the existence of sunspot equilibria. This can also be seen as preliminary work for the following section. We study economies in the generic (as we will show in Lemma 2) set (E) for which nonsunspot M E are regular in the sunspot extension of the economy, and study the real e¤ects of changes in the vector E: Our argument is purely local. Consider an economy 2 (E) with a regular equilibrium (in the economy without sunspots) such that R(E) has full rank and M E display S degrees of real indeterminacy. This M E naturally induces a nonsunspot equilibrium. We show that, modulo a sunspot-invariant perturbation of (u 1 ; ! 1 ) ; this nonsunspot equilibrium is regular in the sunspot economy and that sunspot ME display degrees of real indeterminacy, so that sunspots matter.
Compared with previous results in sunspot economies with nominal assets, (see, Cass [5] , Pietra [24, 25] , and Suda, Tallon and Villanacci [30] ), here we have an additional di¢ culty, related to the monetary eqs. The most convenient approach is to drop the last eqs. of G n0 nd ( ; ; E); eliminating the variable E: We will still use E just to describe the sets of economies which depend upon the selection of a speci…c value of the exchange rates. From now on we call G 
and where
is the ( L ) matrix with generic non-zero coe¢ cients e ks P h ! s h : The standard approach must be adjusted to take care of this additional set of equations. Here, and in the sequel, we start with an arbitrary economy (u; !) and one of its nonsunspot equilibria associated with some e 2 E, = (p; q; e) : We perturb utility functions and endowments, constructing an economy e (e !; e u) such that is still an equilibrium of e and with a very simple structure of the matrix D (p;q) ( ; e ) at , so that we can easily establish that its rank is full. Given e u (which can be taken arbitrarily close to u); we then construct b ! arbitrarily close to ! and such that is an equilibrium for each economy
The structure of the matrix D (p;q) ( ; e u; ! ) shows that, at ; det D (p;q) ( ; e u; ! ) is a nontrivial polynomial in : Hence, at ; det D (p;q) ( ; e u; ! ) = 0 has a …nite number of solutions, and det D (p;q) (p; q; e u; ! ) 6 = 0 for in some generic subset of [0; 1]. This immediately implies that the subset of economies with a regular nonsunspot equilibrium is dense. Its openness follows immediately. The details are in Appendix. Here, we use perturbations of the utility functions,
) and a subset of is generic if it is open and dense.
Lemma 2. Assume A1 and A2; …x E 2 E; and consider the economy with G n0 nd (:) = 0: Then, there is an open, dense subset E such that, for each (!; u) 2 E ; all the nonsunspot equilibria associated with E are regular in the sunspot economy.
Given this result, existence and real indeterminacy of sunspot M E follow immediately. 
i.e., sunspots matter.
EXCESS VOLATILITY OF EXCHANGE RATES AND WELFARE
In this section we study the welfare e¤ects of extrinsic uncertainty. As mentioned in the introduction, excess volatility of exchange rates and its welfare implications have been discussed in the literature from both the empirical and the theoretical viewpoint. In our set-up, the notion of excess volatility can be formalized in at least three di¤erent ways. One could argue that, per se, real e¤ects of extrinsic uncertainty mean excess volatility of the endogenous variables, because, by very de…nition, it is uncertainty unrelated to the fundamentals. However, given a nonsunspot equilibrium, there are sunspots equilibria with a lower value of the variance of the exchange rates. Therefore, to identify sunspot equilibria with "excess volatility" presents some ambiguity. To avoid it, we consider a nonsunspot equilibrium and de…ne excess volatility as a mean-preserving increase of the variance of the exchange rates. A somewhat stronger notion could be de…ned in terms of mean-preserving spreads of the exchange rates prevailing in the nonsunspot economy. This would require us to consider increases in the variability of the exchange rates across extrinsic events, for each intrinsic event, keeping the expected value of the exchange rate invariant for each s: Looking at the proof, it will become clear that, modulo some di¤erences in the details, our result still holds in this case. The only substantive di¤erence is that the maximum number of agents such that Thm. 4 holds decreases from H < [(L 1) S 2] to H < (L 3) S; because the two eqs. var(e) = var and Exp(e) = Exp are replaced by 2S eqs., a pair of similar restrictions for each intrinsic event s > 0 (see Corollary 1) .
Therefore, the question we address in this section is: Pick a nonsunspot equilibrium with vector of exchange rates e: Is there any general welfare implication of an increase in the variance of e; var(e), which preserves its expected value, E(e)?
De…ne the map ; ; V ; var; Exp 2 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 4
( ; )
Exp(e) Exp Given a nonsunspot ME, for an appropriate choice of the vector V and of var; Exp ; we obtain a solution to (:) = 0: The previous question can then be reformulated as: In general, is there a solution to ; ; b V ; d var; Exp = 0 for some vector
As well known (see, Cass and Citanna [6] , Citanna, Kajii, and Villanacci [8] , and Elul [12, 13] ), a su¢ cient condition for a positive answer is that D (:) has full rank (in our set-up, at the nonsunspot equilibrium). When this condition is satis…ed, given ; by the implicit function theorem, we can locally …nd a solution to ( ; ; b
in some open neighborhood of V ; var; Exp : In particular, we can …nd it for each b V >> V ; d var > var; and d Exp = Exp; so that a mean-preserving increase in the variance of future exchange rates leads to a Pareto improvement. Obviously, we also have Pareto worsening mean-preserving increases in their variance (simply, choose
We focus on the comparison of sunspot vs. nonsunspot equilibria. Abstracting from sunspots, one could wonder if variations in the structure of exchange rates satisfying, for instance, some additional restrictions on their covariances with some other relevant variables, could have well-de…ned welfare implications. Our conjecture is that the answer is, in general, negative.
Our approach can be directly (and more simply) applied to economies without sunspots. To introduce additional restrictions on the allowed changes in exchange rates would just alter some of the details of the argument.
In this section we do not need to perturb (M A ; M B ) and r (satisfying A2).
In Appendix, we formally establish the next Thm.
Under the maintained assumptions,
there is an open, dense subset e E ; such that, for each (u; !) 2 e E ; there is a nonsunspot equilibrium such that there are both Pareto improving and Pareto worsening mean-preserving increases in the variance of the exchange rates.
Its result can be strengthened, considering mean preserving spreads of exchange rates in the sunspot economy. This just requires a minor change in the proof.
Under the maintained assumptions, there is an open, dense subset e E ; such that, for each (u; !) 2 e E ; given a nonsunspot equilibrium, there are both Pareto improving and Pareto worsening mean-preserving spreads of the exchange rates in the sunspot economy.
Remark 7. In the proof of Thm. 4, we …x a particular vector e = E and the result holds generically for one of the nonsunspot ME associated with E: One could also strengthen the result, showing that it actually holds generically at each nonsunspot ME associated with E: Moreover, if we are willing to restrict the analysis to bounded and bounded away from zero subsets of the space E; the same result holds generically at each nonsunspot ME: Both arguments are straightforward, but tedious, and therefore omitted.
Remark 8.
A similar result holds when one considers economies with no extrinsic uncertainty as long as 2 H S 2; i.e., as long as the number of "free variables", the S exchange rates, exceeds the number of additional equations (H + 2). Generally speaking, at the Pareto superior allocation sunspots matter, because, in the sunspot economy, the argument works for a number of agents larger than in the nonsunspot economy, given that we have a larger number of "free parameters", instead of S:
The details of the proof of the Thm. are a little cumbersome, but the basic idea is quite simple and develops the approach put forth in Pietra [26] . Let D ; ; V ; var; Exp 2 6 6 6 6 6 4
where (:) is the system of excess demand functions for all the assets and for a collection of (L 1) commodities, selected so that (:) = 0 implies market clearing for all the assets and commodities. 7 By direct computation, and using the sequence of budget constraints, it is easy 7 In the proof of Thm. 4 :
As in the previous section, we replace the actual economy, ; with an economy (u; b !) having the same equilibrium prices, ; and allocation, but with an associated matrix D W (:) having a very simple structure. We then show that, for (u; b !); D (:) has full rank. This may require a sunspot-invariant perturbation of some utility functions and endowments. An argument similar to the one used to establish Lemma 2, shows that this implies that, given and any open neighborhood V ; we can always …nd 0 2 V such that det D :; 0 6 = 0: This is the key result. The details are in Appendix.
Remark 10. Thm. 4 can also be exploited to show that, in economies with real assets (and, possibly, a unique equilibrium), there still exist sunspot equilibria which are Pareto superior to the nonsunspot equilibrium. The Thm. rests on the real indeterminacy of ME because this property is crucial to guarantee that, generically, sunspot equilibria exist. However, real indeterminacy of ME and welfare consequences of excess volatility are two logically distinct issues. This is also because sunspot equilibria may exist in GEI characterized by local determinacy of equilibria, where, as we have seen, exchange rates are a purely nominal variable. In economies where ME are locally unique, sunspot equilibria characterized by excess volatility of exchange rates can still exist and the same results on their welfare consequences can still hold. Pick an economy with two nominal assets. Given a nonsunspot equilibrium associated with some (sunspot invariant) e; there are sunspot equilibria associated with two sunspot-dependent vectors e a ; e b such that x (e a ) Pareto dominates x (e) which, in turn, dominates x e b . Following, essentially, the technique developed in Mas-Colell [20] , if there are enough commodities, there is an economy with real assets such that the three equilibrium allocations x (e) ; x (e a ) ; x e b are equilibria of its sunspot extension.
ECONOMIES WITH G D (:) = 0
With the condition G d (:) = 0; the vector e has to be endogenously determined at the ME, and there is a critical subset of values of e inducing a collapse of rank of R(e): Therefore, the system of excess demand functions is discontinuous over the set of possible exchange rates: Hence, we need a di¤erent existence argument. In our framework, the pseudo-equilibrium map includes the monetary eqs. Our proof of existence is a minor modi…cation of the one in Du¢ e and Shafer [11] . The only di¤erence is in the argument used to show that the derivative of the projection map from the pseudo-equilibrium manifold to the space of the economies is nonsingular. Here we just report the existence result. 8 Thm. 5 refers to economies without 8 The complete proof is in Salto, Pietra [29] . ; of full Lebesgue measure, such that, for each 2 d , there is a ME, with rank R(e) = I: Moreover, at each 2 d ; ME are locally described by a …nite collection of smooth functions, n j ( ) ; The existence argument, given the condition G d (:) = 0; requires a perturbation of the asset structure. Hence, it may fail if we impose additional restrictions, such as the existence of a risk-free asset denoted in each currency. 9 For given (M A ; M B ), equilibria are locally unique for economies with G d (:) = 0: However, in a well-speci…ed sense, the analysis of the previous sections for economies with G nd (:) = 0 carries over to this class of economies, because, locally, the structure of the equilibrium set is the same, in allocation space. Indeed, real indeterminacy of ME for the economies with G nd (:) = 0 translates into e¤ectiveness of monetary policy for the ones with G d (:) = 0: This intuitive relationship is made precise in the following Proposition (the proof is straightforward and, hence, omitted).
is also a ME associated with G nd (:) = 0; given E = e. Moreover, if
This fact is quite convenient, because it allows us to study the properties of ME for one class of economies and to extend the results (modulo a reinterpretation) to the other. Evidently, if we are considering a sunspot equilibrium of the economy de…ned by G nd (:) = 0; the vectors of money supply required to support it as an equilibrium of the economy de…ned by G d (:) = 0 will have to be sunspot-dependent. Consequently, the discussion concerning the welfare e¤ects of excess volatility must be reinterpreted in this set-up as e¤ects of randomness of monetary policy unrelated to the "fundamentals" f(:::; (u h ; ! h ) ; :::) ; r; g of the economy. Evidently, the results of section 4 holds.
Under the maintained assumptions, there is an open, dense subset e ; such that, for each (u; !) 2 e ; there are nonsunspot equilibria such that there are both Pareto improving and Pareto worsening mean-preserving increases in the variance of the exchange rates induced by sunspot-dependent monetary policy vectors (M A ; M B ).
CONCLUSIVE REMARKS
Several properties of equilibrium exchange rates can be discussed exploiting fairly natural extensions of the GEI model with outside money and liquidity constraints proposed in Magill and Quinzii [17] . Depending upon the precise speci…ca-tion of the monetary equations, equilibria can be characterized by local uniqueness or by local indeterminacy. Under the conditions su¢ cient to establish real indeterminacy of ME, there are also sunspot equilibria. A subset of them can be characterized as induced by excess volatility of the exchange rates. Excess volatility can induce both Pareto improvements and Pareto worsening of the equilibrium allocation.
In the Magill and Quinzii [17] class of economies, outside money is injected into the economy because agents must sell their initial endowments to a central exchange and, afterward, buy back their consumption bundle. Real indeterminacy holds if agents (actually, at least some subset of agents) may freely buy and sell from both exchanges. While, in our framework, this is a polar case, it is interesting for several reasons. One of them is that the results obtained (generically) in the indeterminate case may still hold for some sets of economies characterized by local determinacy induced by the speci…cation of the monetary equations (i.e., by the precise mechanism of trade between agents and central exchanges).
APPENDIX

Proofs of Lemma 1 and Theorem 2
Proof of Lemma 1.
The square matrix R(e) is constructed picking any collection of I rows of R(e) with at most one row for each intrinsic event. Pick E such that rank R(E) = I and any 2 0 (E); the set of regular economies associated with E: Pick a regular equilibrium associated with e = E and x; y; : A standard (hence omitted) argument shows that, given e; there is a generic set of economies such that rank [R(e)y 1 ; :::; R(e)y H ] = I (A)
holds. The vector (M A ; M B ) is …xed in the proof, and omitted as an argument of the various functions. We just assume that, for some s; s 0 ;
In the sequel, given e = E, we restrict the analysis to the generic subset of economies Hence, under (A), invariance of the equilibrium allocation at e and b e requires
so that the span of the payo¤ matrix, in terms of real purchasing power, is the same at the two equilibria. Thus, it must be that each column i of R(e) can be expressed as a linear combination of the columns of d 
A (e;r n ) ( ; b e) maps R S+2I into R 2S . Given that S > 2I, by a standard application of the transversality theorem, if A( ; b e; e; r n ) t 0 at each solution A( ; b e; e; r n ) = 0 such that b e 6 = e, then, for a generic choice of (e; r n ); there is no solution to A (e;r n ) ( ; b e) = 0 with b e 6 = e: By direct computation, at a solution to A( ; b e; e; r n ) = 0; is an open, dense set (e; r n ) of full Lebesgue measure such that A (e;r n ) ( ; b e) t 0 at each solution A (e;r n ) ( ; b e) = 0 with b e 6 = e: Thus, A (e;r n ) ( ; b e) = 0 has no solution b e 6 = e; for each economy in some generic set that we can identify with "(E) itself. A standard argument completes the proof.
Proofs of Lemma 2 and Theorem. 3
Here, and in the sequel, we will use extensively the structure of the matrix D (:) and it is convenient to report its most relevant properties (see Balasko and Cass [3] ). Proof of Lemma 2.
Consider an economy (u; !) and any e such that rankR(e) = I: Let be any associated nonsunspot equilibrium. We need to show that, generically, D (p;q) (:) has full rank at ; in the sunspot economy. Bear in mind that all the derivatives are computed at : By direct computation, and rearranging columns, we can rewrite it as
Given (u; !) ; consider a sunspot-invariant perturbation of ! 1 ; with e ! 
F OC 1 (:; u 1 ; ! 1 )j (x1; ) : Moreover, for e small enough, (e u; e !) satis…es A1: It is easy to check that, for each e small enough, is a nonsunspot M E of the economy (e u; e !), with associated allocation e x: Fix any open nbd V (u; !) : For each e su¢ ciently small, (e u; e !) 2 V (u; !) : We now show that there is an economy (! ; e u) arbitrarily close to (e u; e !); hence to (u; !), and such that det D (p;q) (:; e u; ! ) 6 = 0: Given e 6 = 0; …x u = e u and de…ne the economy with b ! 1 = e x 1 and b ! h = x h ; for each h > 1: Evidently, and e x; 0; is a nonsunspot M E of (e u; b !); with e z h = 0: Moreover, at this equilibrium, D (p;q) F OC h (:; e u h ; b ! h ) does not depend, directly, upon the endowments, and, therefore, upon the value of e , and is a full rank matrix, since it is the sum of negative-de…nite matrices. In the economy
and de…ne the matrix
by sunspot invariance of e. Given that G does not depend upon e ; we can arbitrarily perturb e without a¤ecting it. Evidently, if det b F = 0; e is an eigenvalue of G: Given that eigenvalues are locally unique, b F has full rank , modulo an arbitrarily small perturbation e : Then, for an appropriate value of e ; at the associated (e u; b !);
Thus, given any open nbd V (u; !) ; we can pick e and construct (e u; e !) 2 V (u; !) and (e u; b !) so that det D (p;q) (:; e u; b !) 6 = 0:
Given e u; consider the set of endowments . . .
where M h ( ) is given by the last ( + 1) rows of D F OC h (:); after dropping the columns referred to commodity L at each spot. It is clearly a linear function of : Hence, det D (p;q) ( ; e u; ! ) is a polynomial in and det D (p;q) ( ; e u; ! ) 6 = 0 at = 1: Given that non-trivial polynomials have a …nite set of zeros, we can always …nd such that (e u; ! ) is arbitrarily close to (e u; e !); hence to (u; !), and such that D (p;q) (:; e u; ! ) has full rank. This establishes the density part. Openness follows immediately because det D (p;q) (:; e u; ! ) is a continuous function: By Thm. 1, given E; for all the economies in some generic subset 0 (E), for each (u; !) 2 0 (E); all nonsunspot equilibria are regular and there is a …nite number of them. By repeating the argument above for each equilibrium, and taking the intersection of the …nite collection of open, dense sets so obtained, we construct a generic set (E) such that all the nonsunspot equilibria associated with E are regular in the sunspot economy.
Proof of Thm. 3.
The spanning argument exploited to show the real indeterminacy result in Thm. 1 basically works in the sunspot economy, too. Pick a nonsunspot equilibrium associated with e 2 R ++ : Assume that the associated equilibrium is regular in the sunspot economy and that it satis…es (A B) de…ned in the proof of Thm. 2, and
for each s and h:
Pick any two vectors b e 6 = e e, b e; e e 2 V (e) with associated allocations b x and e x: Given that there must be some k(s)s such that b e k(s)s 6 = e e k(s)s ; the pure spanning argument above still applies, when restricted to the vectors e 11 ; e 1s 1 ; e k(s)s ; e 1s+1 ; :::; e 1S . Hence, it must be b x 6 = e x: The real indeterminacy result follows immediately. Moreover, consider any b e such that, for some s and k; k 0 , b e ks 6 = b e The budget constraints in the two states require
Hence,
By (C) above, at e this condition is violated at each s: Hence, it must also be violated
we clearly obtain that b x = e x modulo a permutation of the allocation across extrinsic events. It is far from obvious that one should consider the two equilibrium allocations as di¤erent, from a substantive viewpoint. To avoid this issue, take as starting point a regular sunspot equilibrium with e ks 6 = e k 0 s for each k; k 0 and each s: The same argument implies that, locally, given b e 6 = e e; the associated b x; e x satisfy b x 6 = e x and it cannot be b e ks = e e 
Proof of Theorem 4 and Corollary 1
Restrict the analysis to economies with a regular sunspot equilibrium, i.e., to 2 (E). As motivated in the text, the proof reduces to show that, for each in some generic subset of (E); there is a regular sunspot equilibrium such that
We start with a fairly obvious result.
Fact 2.
Without any loss of generality, the economy (u; !) 2 (E) has a regular nonsunspot equilibrium ; with associated ; such that
Proof of Fact 2. Given ; replace u 1 (x h ) with
for some vector such that h :::;
Given that
; is 1's optimal choice at : Given (x 1 ; (x 1 )) ; u 1 (x 1 ) satis…es A1 above; for su¢ ciently small. The claim follows immediately.
We now replace the actual economy with a new economy ( ), with the same equilibrium and such that the associated matrix D W (:) has a very simple structure. De…ne a one-to-one map f : f2; :::; H 1g ! f:::; (s1; :::; s (L 1)) ; :::g n f11; 21g ; associating with each agent h; 1 < h < H 1; one commodity s`;`6 = L and s`6 = 11; s`6 = 21: For each agent h; 1 < h < H; ! sh ( ) x ksh for all the commodities, but
; and, for the same s, !
Hence, agent h; 1 < h < H; buys one unit of good`paying in terms of commodity
Evidently, is a ME of the new economy ( ) ; associated with x h ; 0; h ; for each h.
For notational convenience, assume that K = (L 1) and H = (KS 2) (the maximum number of agents allowed). For the same reason, and without any loss of generality, assume that e S E(e) = 0: Consider the matrix D (:) ; where all the derivatives are computed at :
De…ne the collection of (L 1) columns
: dp 111 ; dp 212 ; :::; dp K1(L 1) ; :::; dp 1(S 1)1 ; :::; dp (K 1)(S 1)(L 1) , dp 1S1 ; :::; dp
Given any 2 (E) and associated ( ), apply the following column operations (we identify columns in the obvious way) to the matrix D ( ; ( )) : a:
For each ks; add to column dp ksL the sum of the columns dp ks1 ; :::; dp
multiplied by the corresponding
Subtract column dp ksk from column dp k 0 sk to eliminate all the (collinear) columns dp k 0 sk ; k 0 6 = k; c:
Use columns de KS and de K(S 1) to get rid of all the non-zero coe¢ cients in the last two rows. where we use the index s to emphasize that all the variables are sunspot-invariant. Each one of the …rst L columns (but the one referred to good sL) has just two non-zero coe¢ cients: the one of agent h such that s`= f (h) and the one of agent H. By Fact 2, there is no loss of generality in assuming that [ We now show that D nd e (:; ( )) has full rank (L + I 1): We proceed in two steps. Fact 4 shows that, modulo a perturbation of u 1 ; D nd;L e (:; ( )) has full rank. Then, Fact 5 will show that, generically, D nd e (:; ( )) has full rank, too.
Let (:; ( )) be obtained deleting the market clearing eqs. for all the commodities included in the collection d and commodity L in states 0; K(S 1) and KS: Evidently, (:; ( )) = 0 implies market clearing for all the assets and commodities. D F OC 1 . Bear in mind that, at = 0; the last ( + 1) rows of D F OC 1 are identically zero, so that we can drop them whenever convenient.
Given the structure of D F OC 1 ; displayed above (before the proof of Lemma 2), the column operations described above a¤ect:
1. the rows referred to the commodities included in the collections d and L ;
2. the last columns of the rows referred to states K(S 1); KS:
Apply the column operations (a; b; c) described above to D F OC 1 : Drop the rows and columns referred to the commodities included in d and to commodity L in states 0; K(S 1) and KS: For each ks 6 = K(S 1); KS; replace the column referred to commodity L with the one referred to the corresponding exchange rates, obtaining the matrix 
The ones associated with K(S 1) are
Each one of these matrices is a linear function of 1 , independent of ! 1 : All the (L 1) dimensional square matrices on the diagonal have full rank. Hence, given its block triangular structure structure, 
rankD nd;L e (:) = rank
If det D nd;L e (:) = 0; 0 1 is an eigenvalue of the matrix just described. The perturbation of the utility function described above allows us to change arbitrarily : Given that, for every square matrix, eigenvalues are locally unique, modulo an arbitrarily small perturbation of u 1 ; det D nd;L e (:) 6 = 0:
Modulo an arbitrarily small perturbation of ( ) ; D ( nd;L ; L ) e (:) has full rank.
Proof of Fact 5.
We can exploit the same perturbation of (u 1 ; ! 1 ) used in the proof of Lemma Given that D nd;L e (:) has full rank, the following matrix is well-de…ned 
The (sunspot-invariant) perturbation used in the proof of Lemma 2 allows us to change D L e G n0 nd (:) by a term I ; without a¤ecting anything else. As already discussed there, this implies that we can …nd an arbitrarily small perturbation such that, at the associated ; the matrix above has full rank : It follows that, for some economy (e u; e !); arbitrarily close to (u; ! ( )), D e (:) has full rank.
Proof of Theorem 4.
By Fact 2, we can pick an economy in the generic set such that, at a regular nonsunspot equilibrium ,
: Pick any open nbd V : By Fact 3-5, we can construct an economy (e u; e !); arbitrarily close to (u; ! ( )), such that D e (:) has full rank at its nonsunspot equilibrium .
Let e be the perturbation of agent 1's endowment and consumption de…ned in Proof of Corollary 1.
Consider a sunspot-invariant vector e and b e such that b e ks = e s + " ks and, for each s, Exp(" ks js) = 0: Then, b e is a mean-preserving spread of e: To apply the argument of Thm. 4 to this set-up, we just need to replace, in the de…nition of ; ; V ; var; Exp ; the two eqs. var (e) = var; Exp(e) = Exp; with the 2S eqs. var (ejs) = var and Exp(ejs) = Exp: It s easy to verify that the proof works with some, mainly notational, adjustments, once we restrict the analysis to economies with 2 H S(L 3) agents.
PROOF OF THEOREM 5
We consider economies without sunspots, so that L (S +1)L: As well known, in GEI models, the fundamental di¢ culty in the proof of the existence of equilibria is due to the possible drop of rank of the payo¤ matrix when some variables (here, exchange rates) hit some critical set of values. The canonical approach to deal with this problem is in Du¢ e and Shafer [11] . Here, we just need to modify slightly their argument to take care of the additional equilibrium conditions given by the monetary equations G 
It is well known that, under the maintained assumptions, the solution to (2) As well known, under our assumptions, the optimal solution to (3) exists, is C 1 at each (p; ; e) 2 P; and, if = span [R(e)] ; it is also an optimal solution to (2).
Following Du¢ e and Shafer [11] , given M A ; M B ; a vector (p; ; e; ) with associated allocation x is a pseudo-equilibrium if i:
x 1 is an optimal solution to (2) , and x h is an optimal solution to (3), for each h > 1, ii:
In this de…nition, the monetary eqs. are satis…ed only at s > 0: However, modulo a normalization, pseudo-equilibria such that span [R (e)] = are actual ME, according to De…nition 1 in the text, as established below. ; it is straightforward to show that, for h > 1, the budget constraints of (3) and (1) coincide in commodity allocation space, given the prices de…ned above. For h = 1, at the given prices, the set of feasible consumption bundle of problem (1) is contained in the one of problem (2) . By construction, (x 1 ; y 1 ) is a feasible solution to problem (1) at e , while x 1 is the optimal solution to problem (2) at (p; ; e). Hence, (x 1 ; y 1 ) must also be the optimal solution to problem (1) . Therefore, e is a ME.
Given Fact 6, we just need to show that pseudo-equilibria with rank R(e) = I generically exist. Let SI be the Grassmannian manifold of subspaces of R S of dimension I:
SI is a C 1 ; compact manifold without boundary of dimension (S I) I: Let P be the permutation matrix induced by the permutation of the indexes s = f1; :::; Sg and be their set: If 2 SI ; there is 2 and a (S I) I dimensional matrix A such that = open cover of SI ; ' is a homeomorphism of W onto R (S I)I ; and fW ; ' g is an atlas for SI (these are Facts 1-3 in [11] ). De ne as Z (p; ; e; ) the system of aggregate excess demand functions, Z (p; ; e; ) z 1 (p; ; e; 1) + P h>1 z h (p; ; e; ! h ; ): Evidently, Z (:) is C 1 at (p; ; e; ) with (p; ; e) >> 0; and satis es the analogous of the boundary conditions established above for agent 1. Moreover, Z (p; ; e; ) = 0 only if P SI is connected. Hence, applying mod 2 degree theory, if there is a regular value 2 of Pr(:) such that the pseudo-equilibrium is unique, then there is a pseudo-equilibrium for each 2 : Pick any ! 2 R HL ++ such that ! is a Pareto optimal allocation, any e 6 = [1] ; any collection r = r 1 ; :::; r I such that r 1 = r I A +1 = [1] ; rank R(e) = I; and such that the last I rows of R(e) have full rank (all of this can be done under A2). We will choose M A ; M B appropriately later on.
Pareto optimality obviously implies that, for each M We still need to show that this pseudo-equilibrium is regular. Given = id; let G 
